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Summary: The paper evaluates the impact of the complexity approach on economics from two 
viepoints. On the one hand, the dissolution of the shared notion of mainstream, which began in the 
mid ‘80s. Until then, the Samuelsonian paradigm had been able to absorb those contributions that 
critically challenged its assumptions and results. This process took place at the expense of gradually 
blurring the boundaries of the paradigm itself, which has lead to speak of its dissolution. The 
emergence of complexity theory raises the need to either extend further the boundaries of the old 
paradigm so as to close the gap between apparently irreconcilable differences or to define a new 
one. On the other hand, it is legitimate wonder to what extent complexity theory qualifies as a 
‘paradigm’ and thus whether it can be a candidate for substituting the Samuelsonian paradigm.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed a growing influence of complex system analysis on the 
physical, biological and social sciences. Economics has not remained indifferent to the power of 
nonlinear interactions to generate complex structures and an astonishing range of potential 
behaviours. Indeed, the possibility of explaining, in theoretical terms and by means of models, 
complex and sometimes erratic economic phenomena has sparked a rapidly widening interest: the 
theoretical and analytical tools of complex systems analysis have been seen by an increasing 
number of scholars as a promising route towards overcoming important weaknesses of the 
traditional approach to the representation and understanding of economic facts.  
The complexity approach has developed through different lines of thought and across diverse 
disciplines
2 in ways that make it quite difficult to evaluate its impact on economics. The complexity 
perspective implies foundations that clash with the received ones and a methodological stance that 
appears in contrast with the traditional economic theory-making. The latter aspect is rather 
unexplored within the approach, and scholars dealing with it often make discordant claims.  
One of the most important contributions to the development of complexity theory is the foundation 
in 1984 of the Santa Fe Institute devoted to promoting interdisciplinary studies of complex systems. 
Its members included physicists, biologists, computer scientists and economists. Among them was 
Kenneth Arrow, one of the most representative scholars in the mainstream. The Santa Fe Institute 
has generated many of the crucial advances brought about by complexity theory (e.g., agent-based 
modelling, generative science and the SWARM project). However, as far as economics is 
concerned, some of the major complexity scholars seem reluctant to admit that the complexity view 
is a departure from the route traced by the mainstream. An interesting example of such attitude is 
provided by the three volumes (1988, 1997, 2005) published in the Santa Fe Institute series of 
Studies in the Science of Complexity, with the title The Economy as an Evolving Complex System. 
The first volume (Anderson, Arrow and Pines 1988) reflected the contrasting vocation of 
researchers: Anderson insisted on the path-breaking features of the science of complexity, while 
Arrow claimed that the complexity endeavour could be absorbed in the body of traditional 
economic thought. In the second volume, Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997) admit that there is still a 
need to define what are, in this new viewpoint, the problems under study and what kind of solution 
is sought: ‘it is premature to talk about methods for generating and assessing understanding when 
what is to be understood is still under discussion’ (1997, p.14). A few years later, Blume (Blume 
and Durlauf 2001) seems convinced that a discussion on method is no longer necessary, since the 
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complexity approach is only a language for scientific research whose usefulness resides in the 
ability to simplify the analysis under some specific and particular conditions. The third volume 
(Blume and Durlauf 2005) still preserves the ambiguity between innovation and tradition. The 
editors dedicate the book to Kenneth Arrow as the ‘intellectual leader of the SFI [Santa Fe Institute] 
Economics Program ever since its inception’ and  maintain that ‘the models here presented do not 
represent any sort of rejection of neoclassical economics […] that was able to absorb SFI type 
advances without changing its fundamental nature’. Hanappy (2007) points out that there is a 
contradiction between form and contents since the models presented in the volume undeniably run 
counter to the neoclassical framework and assumptions
3. 
Further examples of the resistance in admitting the revolutionary aspects of complexity science in 
economics come from other outstanding scholars within this field of research: the complexity 
approach is confined to an ancillary role also in Kirman (2005, p. 18) and Lesourne (2002), for 
whom complexity theory is of no use in the elaboration of a new methodology, but it is simply a 
way to explain those phenomena that resist to standard analysis. 
Economists who explicitly speak in terms of methodological change are few and their statements 
are sometimes vague. According to Barkley Rosser (2004, p. IX) ‘awareness of the ubiquity of 
complexity is transforming the way that we think about economics’, while B. Arthur highlights a 
change in the reference point for theorisation by stressing that the inclusion of heterogeneity in 
economics makes it more similar to biology than to nineteenth century physics (1994a). As for the 
purport of this change, he agrees that it implies more than a mere extension of standard theory: it is 
a different way of thinking. He also observes that ‘there are signals everywhere these days in 
economics that the discipline is loosing its rigid sense of determinism, that the long dominance of 
positivist thinking is weakening and that economics is opening itself to a less mechanistic, more 
organic approach’(1994a, p. 1). 
S. Markose, in the introductory paper to an issue of the Economic Journal devoted to Computability 
and evolutionary complexity: markets as complex adaptive systems, states that ‘these principles 
mark a paradigm shift from earlier ways of viewing such phenomenon [the market]’ (2005, p. 159). 
However, while Markose gives a comprehensive and interesting survey of the state of the art in 
complexity theory, its origins and application to economics, in the paper the issue of the paradigm 
shift remains untackled. Evaluating the impact of the complexity approach on economic science is 
                                                 
3 A similar contradiction can be found in Epstein (1999). He first states that reproducing the known 
dynamics of a system in an equation is ‘devoid of explanatory power in spite of its descriptive 
accuracy’ (p. 51). However, in the course of the paper he speculates on the possibility of reconciling 
a generative economic science with a deductive one: ‘it would be wrong to claim that Arrow-
Debreu general equilibrium theory is devoid of explanatory power because it is not generative. It 
addresses different questions that those of primary concern here’ (p. 56).   
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important for - at least - two reasons. On the one hand, the dissolution of the shared and demarcated 
notion of mainstream, which began in the mid ‘80s. Until then, the Samuelsonian paradigm, which 
had been the prevalent one since post WWII, had been able to absorb those contributions, such as 
bounded rationality and information theory, that critically challenged its assumptions and results. 
This sweeping process took place at the expense of gradually blurring the boundaries of the 
paradigm itself, which has lead to speak of its dissolution. The emergence of complexity theory 
raises de facto the need to either extend further the boundaries of the old paradigm so as to close the 
gap between apparently irreconcilable differences (as was the case for K. Arrow and the Santa Fe 
Institute), or to define a new one. On the other hand, it is legitimate investigate to what extent 
complexity theory qualifies as a ‘paradigm’ and thus whether it can be a candidate for substituting 
the Samuelsonian paradigm in unifying economics or whether it is just another of the numerous, 
important but not structural, criticism to the mainstream. 
The discussion of these topics which is the object of this paper, allows to formulate the claim that 
the impact of the complexity approach on economic science goes beyond the novelty of its 
particular bringing to the explanation of economic phenomena. 
In contrast with Blume and Durlauf (2001), I feel that complexity science is more than a mere 
language allowing a simplification of analysis. In the paper, I will argue that complexity theory is a 
scientific paradigm whose characteristics imply a methodological revolution. The work is organized 
as follows: Section II provides a definition of complex systems and complexity. Section III analyses 
economic science as seen from the complexity perspective; Section IV describes the elements of the 
complexity paradigm; Section V summarizes the main achievements of complexity theory; Section 
VI relates the complexity view to the thought of some XIX and XX century economists highlighting 
common roots and possible lines of research. Section VII reports some concluding remarks. 
 
II. COMPLEXITY 
1. Complexity: its features 
Complexity in economics has mainly come to be identified with the Santa Fe Institute perspective, 
according to which a complex system is characterised by the presence of a high number of 
interacting heterogeneous agents, the absence of any global controller, the presence of adaptation by 
learning and evolution, and the dominance of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.  
A more detailed description implies five essential features. First, complex systems are comprised of 
many morphologically diverse parts. Economies consist of a huge number of individual agents, 
organised in a great variety of groups and institutional structures. These parts are morphologically 
diverse. Removal of one part leads the system to self-reorganise and to a series of changes aimed at 
compensating for the gap in the system.    5
Second, complex systems exhibit a variousness of nonlinear dynamics. This is due to the fact that 
the different components operate on different temporal and spatial scales. In turn, it implies that 
aggregate behaviour cannot simply be derived from the summation of the behaviour of individual 
components. Even when a catalogue of the activities of most of the participating sub-components is 
available, an understanding of the effect of changes on the whole system is far from achieved.  
Third, complex systems are open, dissipative systems that maintain themselves away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Indeed the large fluctuations we observe in economic time series seem 
to indicate that economies tend to operate in a critical state, way out of balance, where minor 
disturbances may lead to events (avalanches) of all dimensions. Such state is what the literature on 
complexity refers to as self-organized criticality (Bak, 1997).  
Fourth, complex systems can respond adaptively to change, in ways that tend to increase their 
probability of persisting. Their interacting parts adapt by changing their behaviour (even in 
innovative ways) as conditions change and experience accumulates. In turn, the environment of any 
adaptive element largely consists of other adaptive parts. Therefore, a portion of any individual's 
efforts at adaptation is spent adapting to other adaptive individuals. This feature is a major source of 
complex temporal patterns.  
Fifth, complex systems have irreversible histories. In nature, each individual organism is the unique 
result of the interaction between its genetic code and the environment, in social phenomena each 
epiphany is the product of individual actions, under a given institutional setting, in precise 
circumstance of time and space (see 2.1). (Brown, 1994; Kauffman, 1993; Holland, 1995; Gell-
Mann, 1995). 
 
2. Complexity: typology 
As suggested by Foster (2005), economists have developed these features along three distinct but 
interrelated paths: those who look at complexity as an inherent property of the dynamical behaviour 
of the system (or ‘dynamic’ complexity), those who that use the term ‘complexity’ to refer to 
systems whose analysis requires computationally heavy procedures (‘logical’ or ‘computational’ 
complexity) and those that intend complexity as the study of the connections in a system 
(‘connective complexity’) aiming at exploring its evolutionary properties.  
 
2.1 Dynamic complexity 
The most uncontroversial definition of dynamic complexity is essentially a mathematical one: an 
economic system is dynamically complex if its deterministic endogenous processes do not lead it 
asymptotically to a fixed point, a limit cycle, or an explosion (Day, 1994). All systems that fit this 
definition have some degree of nonlinearity within them. At the same time, there are nonlinear   6
systems that are not complex, such as standard exponential growth models. Non-linear systems 
may, for example, generate periodic fluctuations (or limit cycles), that is fluctuations that are 
regularly cyclical, with specific configurations repeated at fixed intervals. Non-linearity is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for complexity: complex dynamics are processes that involve 
non-periodic fluctuations and switches in regime or structural changes, such as those implied by 
bifurcations and transitions to chaos.  
The latter are object of two important branches in the theory of complex dynamics. Bifurcation 
theory is the study of points in a system at which the qualitative behaviour of the system changes – 
the critical thresholds that may trigger drastic change. Bifurcation theory makes it possible to study 
the behaviour of a nonlinear system over time. This kind of analysis is referred to as comparative 
dynamics.
4 It enables us to see if a qualitative kind of behaviour persists when the initial conditions 
are perturbed. It also provides hints on the type of change that can occur when some crucial 
parameters, instead of being assumed constant for analytical convenience, are allowed to vary. It 
allows us to study, for example, the conditions that can bring about irreversible or slowly reversible 
changes. Therefore, it also makes it possible to study the extent to which the behaviour of a system 
could be influenced or controlled by policy. Chaotic dynamics are another important kind of 
complex behaviour. The term chaos in its present meaning was first used by Li and Yorke (1975). 
However, the significance of such behaviour in the natural sciences had already been recognised by 
Lorenz (1963) in meteorology, and May (1974, 1975) in population biology.  
There exist several different mathematical definitions of chaos.
5 The common underlying concept, 
however, is randomness or irregularity that arises in a deterministic system. The intuitive notion is 
that of a time evolution with sensitive dependence on initial conditions – that is, arbitrarily close 
initial conditions display independent evolution as time proceeds. The two other basic properties are 
topological transitivity (indecomposability), and density of periodic points. 
All such features have strong implications from the point of view of the analysis of economic 
systems. Sensitivity to initial conditions implies unpredictability; the system shows path-
dependence and although in principle it should be possible to predict future dynamics as a function 
of time, this is in fact impossible because any error in specifying the initial condition, no matter 
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economics is in Day (1994). 
 
5 For a formal definition see, for example, Devaney (1998) and Ott (1993). The latter offers an in-
depth and broad treatment of the subject of chaos in dynamical systems, whereas the former is in 
essence a mathematics text. More accessible introductions are Devaney (1992), Lorenz (1993), 
Peak and Frame (1994), and Ruelle (1991) (in order of increasing reader-friendliness). A 
fascinating application of chaos theory to the study of biological systems and physiological rhythms 
is Glass and Mackey (1988).   7
how small, leads to an erroneous prediction at some future time. Indecomposability implies that it is 
not possible to derive implications on the behaviour of the system’s subcomponents by analysing 
them separately. Yet, the presence of elements of regularity (periodic points) leaves room for a 
deeper understanding based on the accumulation of experience and data, as we keep perturbing the 
system and studying its reactions.  
In economics, chaotic dynamics have received a great attention, particularly since the 1990s.
6 An 
analysis of this literature reveals at least three major theoretical implications of chaos for economic 
models. First, the existence of chaos offers a further plausible explanation for the pervasive 
irregularity of economic time series – an endogenous one – in addition to the conventional theory of 
exogenous shock (Goodwin 1991). A second implication is that the possibility of chaotic dynamics 
would render the rational expectations hypothesis untenable even if all its underlying assumptions 
were satisfied, e.g. if all agents had perfect information on the functioning of the economy and on 
the behaviour of the other agents (Kelsey 1988, pp. 682-83; Chiarella 1990, pp. 124-125; Medio 
and Gallo 1992, pp. 17-18). Perfect foresight out of steady states would be impossible, in 
economics as in physics and biology. A third implication of chaos concerns the irreversibility of 
time. Although dissipative systems could, - in principle - be integrated either forward or backward 
in time, in practice a correct computation of the path of the system in the past is generally not 
possible: it would require an absolute precision in determining the current position. In the presence 
of chaotic dynamics, however time reversibility becomes impossible in theory. In fact, if we 
consider a unimodal map f, for example, the existence of a turning point makes f non--invertible 
because the inverse of f is set-valued: the inverse of f is no longer a function – it maps not onto a 
point but into a set of points. Functions that display chaotic dynamics can therefore only be 
integrated forward in time.
7  
 
2.2 Computational Complexity 
Computational complexity refers to the computational and cognitive skills of the decision makers. 
In deciphering the environment in order to make a decision, the decision maker may face two kinds 
of computational complexity (Albin 1998). The first one concerns problems that are undecidable, so 
that no mind or computer can devise a computational procedure able to solve them in a finite time. 
A typical example of such a problem is self-reference: an agent has to form conjectures about the 
                                                 
6 Examples include Chiarella (1999), Brock et al. (1991), and Medio and Gallo (1992). A number 
of representative papers are collected in Benhabib (1992), Creedy and Martin (1994), Dechert 
(1996), Barnett et al (1996), and Hamouda and Rowley (1999).  
 
7 For a more thorough discussion of the implications of chaos for economic modelling, see 
Gandolfo (1997), pp. 528-32. 
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conjectures of the other agent(s): assuming that each decision maker tries to foresee what the 
others’ conjecture would be and to adjust her own on that basis, this leads to a procedure that never 
settles on a solution. Undecidability is not overcome by perfect rationality
8 and foresight since they 
could lead to infinite regress
9. The agent should resort to some other aids to settle on a solution. 
These could be procedural rationality (Simon 1969), animal spirits (Keynes 1973, ch. XII), or focal 
points (Schelling 1960, p. 57). In economic literature, there are many examples of self-reference
10, 
but it is with the development of the complexity approach that they have become central to choice 
theory (Arthur 1994b).  
The second type of computational complexity regards problems that are in theory decidable but for 
which the cost of an optimal solution can be so high as to deprive the optimal choice of any possible 
advantage for the decision maker (Albin 1998, p. 46). 
Undecidability and computational costliness shed light on the controversy regarding the 
epistemological or ontological nature of complexity. McIntire (1998) posed the question whether 
complexity is merely a revival of the old debate concerning indeterminism versus hidden variables. 
Undecidability suggests that there are limits to our knowledge that do not depend on us but on the 
nature of the problem; in these cases complexity is ontological. In the context of decidable 
problems, the presence of computational costs and limited cognitive skills suggests (Simon 1969) 
that there are limits on our side that prevent us from deciphering complexity; in these cases 
complexity is epistemological.  
As will be shown, computational complexity implies that mathematical maximisation techniques 
cannot be applied to modelling economic decision making. Furthermore, studies in rationality have 
shown that human computational skills are inadequate to support heavy computations, and therefore 
that the optimal choice is often unattainable. Thus, computational complexity compels us to search 
for new models and metaphors for decision-making.  
 
2.3 Connective Complexity 
Connective complexity refers to the links existing between the elements forming a system. In the 
presence of connective complexity, it is the kind of relationship that links the elements of the 
                                                 
8 Actually, it may be worsened by it (Koppl and  Barkley Rosser, 2002). 
 
9 This is a merely illustrative analysis of non decidability. For a more technical treatment see, for 
instance, Binmore (1987) and (Albin 1988). 
 
10 Cournot’s duopoly (1838),  Morgenstern’s Holmes- Moriarty problem (1928-1935), Keynes’ 
beauty contest (1936, p. 156), Hayek’s arguments against prediction (1967), Arthur’s (1994b) El 
Farol Bar Problem. 
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system to one another that shapes their behaviour, and it is the changes in such relationships that 
cause the system to evolve. The hallmark of this kind of complexity is the emphasis on forces that 
act to maintain the order of the system and on countervailing forces that drive it towards disorder. 
The struggle between the two generates novel elemental kinds and relations, and leads to the 
disappearance of some (say, old or unfit) structures. It is this process of creative destruction that 
fosters selection and, thus, evolution (Foster - Metcalfe 2001). Connective complexity has been 
recently elaborated by Foster (2005), but its features closely recall Hayek’s theory of spontaneous 
orders. A spontaneous order has a degree of complexity which depends on ‘the minimum number of 
elements of which an instance of the pattern must consist in order to exhibit all the characteristic 
attributes of the class of patterns in question’ (Hayek 1967, p. 76).   
The elements of a spontaneous order (agents), in obeying autonomously to their own laws of motion 
(action), arrange themselves into a system characterised by regularities that can be explained in 
terms of those laws
11. The overall result depends on the feedback between individual action and the 
environment. Other features that are attributed to such an order are ‘redundancy’ (the functioning of 
the overall order is not much affected by the malfunctioning of some of its parts because of the high 
number of links existing among the elements, e.g. the market) and path-dependency (the 
consequences of stochastic events determine situations that once established follow a certain path). 
Moreover, within spontaneous orders, evolution (in terms of rules that are more o less favourable to 
the survival and prosperity of the group) takes place both at the individual and group level.  
In connective complexity (and spontaneous orders) - in opposition to the traditional assumptions of 
economic theory - macro regularities do not result from homogeneity of means and ends, nor from 
linearity in interaction; rather they derive from the relationship that links the elements to one 
another. This is more than sharing some common property such as Olympic rationality and perfect 
knowledge. Sugden (1996) provides a helpful example. He compares the mainstream view of agents 
and their interaction to bricks. He observes that all bricks when dropped from the top of a building 
fall downwards. Once the brick’s law of motion is known, ‘we can form correct expectations about 
the behaviour of all bricks, but the regularity we observe is nothing but the common property itself’. 
In contrast, Hayek’s (and Foster’s) view implies that the macro regularities are generated by the 
properties of the links that connect the agents. Sugden (1996) exemplifies this case with the gradient 
of a scree slope which ‘is a property that the rocks have in relation to one another’. Connective 
complexity appears as a criticism to the reductionism of the traditional approach. It is impossible to 
study the properties of complex systems by observing its elements in isolation. 
Connections between elements are relevant since they determine the ‘goodness’ of a complex 
system. That is to say that a given system can be more or less beneficial for its elements depending 
                                                 
11 Hayek is considered a precursor of generative science (Vriend 1999).   10
on the configuration of the network of connections. For instance, a market can be more or less 
efficient depending on its rules of exchange, or an innovation can spread more or less rapidly 
depending on links among adopters. 
 
III. THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT ECONOMICS 
 From the above analysis, it emerges that the complexity perspective implies, as compared to the 
mainstream view a radically different perception of the nature of economic phenomena that rely on 
heterogeneity, processes and evolution. This attitude, as far as theorising is concerned, results in the 
rejection of the pervasiveness of linearity, of the perfect rationality postulate, of the centrality of the 
equilibrium, and of reductionism; when it comes to modelling, it results in the refusal of the view of 
economics as a purely mathematical science.  
Theorising and modelling are only apparently separated in the mainstream view. As Schumpeter 
emphasized (1954), the introduction of mathematics in economics with the Marginalist revolution 
triggered a change in economic methods. The adoption of the mathematical method of reasoning 
changed: ‘one’s whole attitude to the problems that arise from theoretical schemata of quantitative 
relations between things’ (1954, p. 955). Economics progressively tended to became a mathematical 
science. The process was completed in Vienna in the 1930’s with the axiomatization of the general 
equilibrium theory accomplished by K. Schlesinger and J. von Neumann. In von Neumann’s 
perspective, the concern for a realistic interpretation of economic models disappears. Von Neumann 
proposed mathematical solutions to theoretical problems. Solutions aimed at elegance were 
characterised by the elegance of the solution itself, logical completeness, concision and rigour even 
if obtained under extremely abstract assumptions. Eventually, and for about fifty years, 
mathematics
12 predominates on the economic content (Debreu 1986). Economic propositions 
embedded in theorems and proofs have geometric precision and a general
13 and abstract 
applicability, disregard realism and derive their validity from correctness of logical deduction. As 
Debreu writes: ‘as a formal model of an economy acquires a mathematical life of its own, it 
becomes the object of an inexorable process in which rigor, generality, and simplicity are 
                                                 
12 ‘An axiomatized theory first selects its primitive concepts and represents each one of them by a 
mathematical object. […] Next assumptions on the objects representing the primitive concepts are 
specified, and consequences are mathematically derived from them. The economic interpretation of 
the theorems so obtained is the last step of the analysis. According to this schema, an axiomatized 
theory has a mathematical form that is completely separated from its economic content. If one 
removes the economic interpretation of the primitive concepts, of the assumptions, and of the 
conclusions of the model, its bare mathematical structure must still stand’ (Debreu, 1986, p.1265)  
 
13 ‘The pursuit of generality in a formalized theory is no less imperative than the pursuit of rigor’ 
(Debreu 1986, p. 1267). 
   11
relentlessly pursued’ (Debreu 1986, p. 1265). It follows that the adoption of different mathematical 
views (such as the ones sketched in the paragraph devoted to dynamic complexity) does not only 
imply a change in the modelling tools, it also involves a (further) change of method of reasoning.  
Attempts to explore complex adaptive systems bring about a necessary shift towards nonlinear 
mathematics. On the analytical stance, non-linear mathematic is less elegant and rigorous than the 
linear one. In fact, one reason for the widespread use of linear differential and difference equations 
in economics is that such equations are always solvable, whereas nonlinear models offer no such 
guarantee. Moreover, whereas linearity is unique, there exist countless possible nonlinear forms. In 
situations when we only know that a generic nonlinear functional relation exists with given 
qualitative properties (for example, conditions on the first order partial derivatives, such as their 
sign and given bounds), the feasible analysis is purely qualitative
14. The choice of a specific 
nonlinear functional relationship, unless there are compelling theoretical or empirical reasons in 
favour of a certain form, can in fact be as arbitrary as linearity. In some cases, specific nonlinear 
functional forms may however serve the important purpose of showing that a certain dynamical 
behaviour is possible. Their role may be simply to highlight that a certain motion cannot be ruled 
out, with no claim that the model constructed is more general or more accurate than the 
corresponding linear model.  
If we keep thinking - in Debreu’s vein- that mathematical forms dictate the rules of economic 
thinking, then non-linear mathematics involves a completely different view and, therefore, a 
different method, in which generality and abstraction cannot be the hallmarks and in which 
traditional techniques do not apply.  
For instance, let us think in terms of connective complexity. In the traditional view, the net of links 
that shapes the economy is kept very simple due the hypotheses of complete information and 
perfect knowledge. These allow to assume that each element of the economy can ‘contact’ and 
‘evaluate’ all the others elements at no cost, so that the network of connections is irrelevant to the 
functioning of the system. This is functional to the possibility of conducting an equilibrium analysis 
in mathematical forms: ‘[interconnections] are akin to mathematical operators which must stay 
fixed if logical deductions concerning equilibrium outcomes are sought’ (Foster 2005, p. 884). This 
condition does not apply to complex systems which are subject to changes that alter the very 
structure of the system; the existence, the position, the nature of the connections; and, thus, impair 
the possibility of focusing on equilibria.  
                                                 
14 Indeed, in economic theory purely qualitative nonlinearity is often regarded as the true 
generalization of linear dynamics (Gandolfo, 1997). 
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Moreover, the continuous variations taking place in connections due to adaptation and non-
simultaneity of actions - together with the dynamic unfolding through historical time often impede 
the use of optimisation techniques. Optimisation is practicable under the hypothesis of knowing all 
possible outcomes of the process under analysis and the probability associated with each of them. 
These conditions are not met in complex systems. Within complex systems, uncertainty is 
inescapable. Therefore, optimisation cannot be taken as a metaphor for individual or organisational 
decision-making, and there are not the conditions to apply it as mere technique.   
In the light of these considerations the claims I made in the introduction seems strengthened: the 
theoretical and methodological apparatus of the complexity approach is irreconcilable with the 
Samuelsonian view of economic science and economic facts. As long as there is a substantial 
agreement on the nature of complex systems, it seems naive not to accept its consequences on 
economic methods. I am keen to conclude that most of the quotes reported in the introduction that 
do not support this idea depend on a tendency to neglect methodological issues (Vriend 1999). If we 
accept the provisional conclusions that the complexity approach is in fact a methodological 
revolution, what would the economics of complexity be? 
 
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEXITY: THE ELEMENTS OF A NEW PARADIGM 
1. Premises 
The complexity view of economic phenomena pivots on uncertainty, limited cognitive and 
computational skills on the side of decision makers, stresses heterogeneity and focuses on processes 
instead of equilibrium. In the following sections the implications of these underpinnings on the 
notion of economic science and on theory making and modelling will be drawn. 
 
1.1 On the role of mathematics 
Drawing the characteristics of the economic of complexity requires some more reflections on the 
role of mathematics in economics. I have already shown that the mathematics adopted by the 
mainstream is unable to describe complex systems .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  m u s t  b e  s a i d  t h a t  t a k i n g  t h e  
complexity perspective to its extreme consequences leads to criticisms to mathematics tout court – 
i.e. including chaos and bifurcations.  
The high number of elements of a complex system and their heterogeneity do not allow grouping 
those elements in a few broad categories (e.g. the consumer, the firm, the representative agent) 
and therefore would require mathematical systems made of a great number of equations, 
increasing the computational load and the difficulty in analytical treatment. 
Under connective complexity, a complex system assumes a given configuration according to the 
properties of its elements (heterogeneity) and to the nature of the connections between them. The   13
state of the system is subject to evolution and selection and therefore there are variations in 
topology and dynamics. In other words, it is important to consider not only the system's dynamics, 
but also how the dynamics themselves change over time. It follows that it is often impossible to 
freeze the behaviour of the system in a model made of equations (no matter whether they are linear 
or not) since its dynamic is not fixed but evolutionary.  
When it comes to capturing innovation, any kind of model expressed in the form of equations, being 
inherently deterministic, cannot generate ‘new behaviour’ of the components of the system or new 
elements: in order to account for similar phenomena the equations must be reformulated. The 
evolutionary process is made of adaptation and selection: agents change their rules of behaviour 
according to some index of performance conveyed by the environment, while differential 
reproduction of the fittest individual and mutation trough combinatorial reproduction imply changes 
in the population ecology.  
These phenomena escape mathematical treatment by systems of simultaneous equations: the 
mathematics of complexity depicts non-linear systems that are non-adaptive. It seems that the 
understanding of complex economic phenomena involves taking further distance from mathematical 
modelling. 
1.2 The loss of certainty 
The project of building a unified economic theory, which has fascinated economists in the last two 
decades, has failed. Its accomplishment would have guaranteed certainty – machine-like precision, 
objectivity - to economic science. Its failure implies the abandonment of a neat distinction between 
subject (homo oeconomicus) and object (well-defined problems), of the possibility of grounding on 
few propositions (e.g. rational choice) the entire micro-macroeconomic theoretical apparatus and 
the fading of its predictive power (Arthur 1994a).   
Contemporary economists are left with a research agenda which is completely different from that 
characterising the beginning of the last century. The complexity approach - inherently distant from 
positivist thinking - does not seem to suffer much from the loss. As it will appear in the course of 
this section, the nature of a complex system is per se irreconcilable with a science that seeks 
certainty. It is not only a matter of non-linearity and unpredictability: agents acting in complex 
environments have no clear image of the problem to be solved nor are they separated from it. The 
process of problem representation in a context of heterogeneity in environments, in the way agents 
frame problems and in the way they devise solutions makes the set of possible outcomes explode. 
Theoretically, it is the recognition of heterogeneity that makes the project of building economic 
theories as if they were Chinese boxes inconceivable. The complexity approach to economics is less 
mechanistic and more organic than the traditional one.  
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1.3 The loss of generality 
Continuous endogenous change together with the relevance of heterogeneity, connections and 
historical time to the overall configuration of a complex system imposes a shift from the search for 
general laws to a search for general patterns at best, and an increased importance of contingent 
information on the specific system being studied. Even where the mathematical derivation of results 
is possible and takes – as it often does – the standard form of theorems and proofs, their purport is 
limited to the system being studied or to a strict range of its instances.   
Loss of certainty is a logical consequence of the premises presented above and is indeed 
acknowledged by some prominent economists: Frank Hahn writes: ‘not only will our successors 
have to be far less concerned with general laws than we have been, they will have to bring to the 
particular problems they will study particular histories and methods capable of dealing with the 
complexity of particular, such as computer simulation. Not for them […] the pleasure of theorems 
and proofs. Instead, the uncertain embrace of history, sociology and biology’ (2001, p. 50).  
Complexity resort requires resorting to observation of a large number of instances in order to gain 
understanding of the phenomenon under study ‘as a ‘theoremless’ laboratory biologist […]’ just as 
in any empirical science for which general laws are not yet in hand’(Epstein 1999, p. 51). 
 
1.4 An organic approach 
The account provided by Colander (2003) of two conferences held at the Santa Fe Institute nearly a 
decade apart, highlights a dramatic change. The first conference, held in the mid 80s, featured a set 
of mainstream economists and defenders of general equilibrium orthodoxy and a set of physicists. 
At this first conference, Colander remembers, the economists mostly attempted to defend their 
axiomatic approach, ‘facing sharp challenges and ridicule from the physicists for holding relatively 
simplistic views’ (Colander 2003, p. 8). The second one, held in the mid 90s, was characterised by a 
very different atmosphere and result: ‘No longer were mainstream economists adhering to general 
equilibrium orthodoxy. Now they were using methods adopted from biologists and physicists, many 
suggested at the earlier conference, in innovative ways’ (ibidem)
15.  
Complexity theory compels economics to leave behind nineteenth century physics and to move 
towards a more organic approach. The loss of certainty and generality, the role of the researcher as 
an observer of particular regularities, the importance of history and time in determining the 
behaviour and the performance of economies impair the use of abstract and general explanations. 
The features of complex systems recall the idea of economies as organisms that adapt, innovate, 
                                                 
15 Studies presented at those conferences are collected in Anderson et al. (1988) and 
Brian et al. (1997) respectively. 
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develop and eventually decline. This idea was at the very inception of complexity, as conjectured 
by N. Wiener, J. von Neumann and the cybernetic group. The object of cybernetics was to 
understand (mainly mathematically at that time) the functioning of highly organised but 
decentralised systems composed of very large numbers of individual components such as life, 
biological evolution, economies, and machines. The endeavour was founded on the assumption that 
these diverse systems have features in common – in spite of evident differences in scale, elements 
and rules - that permit a unified approach.  
Complexity takes a more organic stance not just as a vague pretension of taking biology as a 
reference point - it is rather a research agenda proper. Instruments used to emulate problem solving, 
adaptation and innovation are explicitly grounded on biological models and metaphors. For 
instance, genetic algorithms (Holland 1975), used to simulate learning and adaptation, are modelled 
on the processes of biological evolution. A genetic algorithm manipulates a set of structures called 
population. Each structure is assigned a value (fitness) based on the result of its interaction with the 
environment. Genetic algorithms operate on the population by replicating making copies of 
individuals in proportion to the observed fitness, i.e. the fittest ones have a higher chance to be 
reproduced. The outcome is a population of individuals that adapt increasingly well to the 
environment
16. It is worth recalling that all these operations take place out of the researcher’s 
control and independently of her degree of knowledge of the system under study. Economists 
engaged in this line of thought observe human living beings, their organisations and their 
institutions with the aim of trying to uncover the rules guiding their behaviour and generating the 
phenomena of interest. 
Arthur (1994a) uses the term ‘organic’ also to highlight that economics deals with living beings, 
with people having emotions and weaknesses, dealing with an ever-changing environment made of 
other living beings that likewise try to cope with complexity. In this context, another element of the 
complexity paradigm emerges: in a world of mutual adaptation and limited information, it is 
impossible to use deduction in order to formulate satisfactory decisions. In the El Farol bar problem 
illustrated by Arthur (1994b), agents must foresee attendance to the bar by observing attendance in 
the previous weeks. The underlying idea is that if the bar is very crowded no one wishes to go and 
vice versa, a typical situation in which the payoffs of an action are higher the fewer the people 
undertaking it. A corresponding economic example is that of buying when everybody is selling and 
the price is falling. Agents form their expectation self-referentially: if they expect the bar to be 
crowded they will not show up, therefore invalidating the forecast, and vice versa. In self-referential 
situations, decision makers rely on induction, trying different routines and choosing the best one in 
                                                 
16 Other learning algorithms such as classifier systems and Neural Networks work in a similar way. 
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terms of performance. Since each choice alters the performance of the others, the ecology of 
routines changes over time. Since self-reference is typical of complex systems, we can conclude 
that the scope for deduction in the complexity approach is greatly reduced, and the distance from 
the mainstream point of view increased.  
 
2. Microfoundations 
2.1 Procedural rationality 
In complex environments, decision makers have to face diversity, unpredictability, self-reference, 
change and Knightian uncertainty. This consideration forces us to shift from Olympic rationality, as 
assumed by mainstream economics, to procedural rationality. In the former, knowing the objectives 
of the decision maker and the objective data of the problem to solve is sufficient in order to label 
behaviour as rational. In the latter, it is recognised that individuals and organisations, being 
endowed with limited cognitive and computational skills, cannot cope with the huge amount of 
information embedded in a complex system and cannot process the fluxes of information flowing in 
it. Mainstream economics defines rationality as a relation of means to ends: a decision maker has 
the entire set of relevant information and can work out the outcome of different courses of action; 
among them, he can choose the best action in order to pursue its ends. This view is not applicable to 
complexity. H. Simon (1962, 1969) pointed out that the agents have bounded rationality, i.e. are not 
able to perform the above computation even in rather simple settings. Bounded rationality aroused 
much interest among economists captured the interest of the economists, was rapidly adopted by 
heterodox economists and was eventually integrated in the mainstream. Actually, bounded 
rationality does not apply to indeterminate situations: rather than an alternative concept it is a 
weaker formulation of the rationality postulate. 
However, complex systems pose a further challenge to the analysis of decision-making. In an ever-
changing environment, it is almost impossible to prefigure the outcome of decisions with a 
satisfactory degree of precision. This impairs the whole concept of rationality in terms of adequacy 
of actions to achieve given goals. In order to define the decision making process under such 
occurrences Simon introduces procedural rationality. Decision making under uncertainty in 
complex environments takes into account the agent’s conceptualisation of the problem to be solved 
and her ability in drawing inference based on available information (Simon 1969). The focus is on 
the skill in building an adequate representation of the problem and to adapt it in reaction to 
environmental response with the aim of improving the performance of actions. Behaviour can be 
dubbed as rational if it derives from an appropriate deliberation. The decision maker concocts 
alternatives on the ground of her own (partial) information and adopts the first strategy that is 
expected to satisfactorily (not optimally) solve her problem. In this decision-making process,   17
learning plays a crucial role. By learning, the information set is updated and new options are 
generated. The agents adapt to the environment and, by innovating, contribute to its change. 
The mainstream view agrees with Lucas who states ‘in cases of uncertainty, economic reasoning 
will be of little value’ (1981, p.224). On the contrary, procedural rationality offers a theoretical tool 
allowing to extend economic reasoning in the domain of uncertainty.   
At the operational level, abandoning the rationality postulate amounts to leave behind the 
representation of decision making as an optimisation procedure and the definition of its outcome as 
equilibrium. Firstly, optimisation applies only when the set of future outcomes and their associate 
probability are known. Secondly, in order to consider the output of such a procedure as an 
equilibrium, it is necessary that all the rest of system remains unchanged. None of these conditions 
is satisfied in a complex environment. Procedural rationality can be modelled by using learning 
algorithms (neural networks, genetic algorithms and the like) that respect the assumptions of limited 
information, limited computational skills, adaptation and induction. 
 
2.2 Explanation, Solution and Prediction 
The notions of explanation, solution and prediction that are relevant for the economics of 
complexity derive from Joshua Epstein concept of generative science (1999)
17. In generative 
science, explaining a phenomenon amounts to finding the micro rules and the configuration of links 
that are sufficient to make it emerge from decentralised autonomous interaction (Epstein 1999, 42). 
That is to say that explaining a phenomenon amounts to generating it from the bottom up – a neat 
difference with respect to the mathematical treatment of mainstream economics. Mainstream 
economics, in fact, holds to have explained a phenomenon when a mathematical expression that can 
replicate the dynamics of a system is found: explanation coincides with description
18. Faced with 
such mathematical expression, a complexity theorist would speak of description, since there is no 
knowledge of the underlying mechanisms that generate it. If a given set of rules generates the macro 
regularity of interest then it is a candidate explanation. If there is more than one candidate 
explanation then further investigation is required. In the 90s, techniques apt to explore the output of 
agent-based models were at their dawning. The problem of distinguishing between specifications, 
comparing models and testing their sensitivity was a prevalent one (Axelrod 1997, Axtell and 
Epstein 1994, Holland and Miller 1991) since the relatively scarce experience in this field. 
                                                 
17 See also Epstein (2006), where the same concepts are enriched with interesting applications. 
 
18 Epstein (1999, p. 51) puts it in a slightly different way, contrasting explanation with description.  
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Recently, the state of things much improved (Phan and Amblard 2007, Windrum, Fagiolo and 
Moneta 2007) and this concept of ‘explanation’ is strengthened by the possibility of choosing the 
best candidate explanation among alternative ones. This change in the notion of explanation is ripe 
with implications. Firstly, in line with the Santa Fe program (Anderson and Arrow 1988; Arthur, 
Durlauf and Lane 1997), economies are seen as sets of processes. This is a further shift from the 
pivotal importance of equilibrium in mainstream economics. The existence (and the persistence) of 
equilibrium is of secondary interest, while the main work to be done is to uncover the process that 
generates it –from the bottom up.  
It has already been said that equation-based models cannot reproduce nor explain adaptive 
processes. Agent-based models overcome the problems of equation-based models since they allow 
for the representation of numerous instances of heterogeneous agents that interact autonomously. In 
addition, by using learning algorithms (genetic algorithms, neural networks and classifier systems) 
they also introduce the adaptation-selection mechanism necessary to foster evolution and free the 
researcher from the necessity to assume maximising behaviour
19. 
 One could object that a simulation is indeed a computation, and as - according to the Church-
Turing thesis - for every computation there is an equivalent representation in terms of equations, 
simulation are nothing but mathematics (Fontana 2006). In principle, this is undeniably true. 
However, when it comes to writing down and then solving such a model (possibly comprising 
hundreds of instances of different individuals and evolutionary algorithms) computational 
complexity arises: as discussed above, the choice of the appropriate functional form is not trivial 
and the same must be said about its solution. The concept of solution becomes weaker than in 
traditional mathematical modelling. Instead of a ‘specific element of a well designed function 
space’ (Epstein 1999, p. 52) it represents an interval of elements or, in the case of computational 
models, it is a ‘sample path of a stochastic process’ (ibidem). The aim for generality is greatly 
reduced. 
A further point is the role of prediction in economic science, which was crucial in the influential 
work of Milton Friedman. He thought (1953, p. 7) that the ‘ultimate goal of a positive science is the 
development of ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) 
predictions about the phenomena not yet observed’. Given that complex systems are ontologically 
unpredictable (see section 2.1) a science dealing with them cannot take prediction as its aim: the 
attempt at predicting well the behaviour of the system cannot constitute the benchmark against to 
which evaluate the goodness of a theory. The concept of explanation as above illustrated founds the 
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entire building of generative science. Unpredictability is not an obstacle to explanation: 
‘electrostatics explains lightning but does not predict their occurrence’ (Epstein 1999, p. 55). 
3.  A paradigm shift 
Various approaches critical towards mainstream economics have developed since the 60s. The term 
heterodox economics includes different streams of thought that show more or less pronounced 
difference with the received theories. Most of them, however, were isolating violations of the 
axioms of the received theory while keeping its framework almost intact. A leading example is 
experimental economics, which has shown violations of the expected utility theory axioms. As far 
as complexity theory is concerned, on the contrary, all of its manifestations are in contrast with the 
mainstream approach marking a methodological revolution meeting all the conditions set by Kuhn 
(1962). A similar operation cannot be conducted in the context of complexity theory: all its 
manifestations are in contrast with the mainstream approach. Economics is facing a methodological 
revolution which meets all the conditions set by Kuhn (1962). According to Kuhn, a scientific 
revolution takes place when scholars find anomalies that cannot be reconciled with the commonly 
acknowledged paradigm within which research has until then been conducted. Kuhn’s definition of 
a paradigm is based on four elements: what is to be examined, what kind of questions are supposed 
to be asked and how answers have to be found and how these questions have to be structured, and 
how the results of investigations should be interpreted. Roughly, economics in all its declinations 
observes the behaviour of individual and organisations, and its results in terms of production and of 
distribution – among people and among uses - of resources in time and space. In doing so, 
mainstream economics takes as subject the homo oeconomicus endowed with a high degree of 
information and with the ability of processing it, and, as object, well-defined problems with 
likewise well-defined (probable) outcomes. Complexity economics places limited demand on the 
agent’s cognitive skill and endows her with limited information (self-reference, adaptation and 
innovation do not allow for different assumptions).  Problems are not well-defined: firstly, decision 
makers have to build their own representation of the problem on the basis of limited knowledge of 
the surrounding environment; secondly, agents often are not able to assign probabilities to the 
outcomes of their action or simply cannot figure out what these will be. They act under genuine 
uncertainty. Mainstream economics sees agents and their aggregations such as markets or 
economies as relentlessly engaged in the search for equilibria, and proceeds by comparing them 
those equilibria to find out about their properties. Complexity economics observes the economies 
and the decision-making as processes that never end. When equilibrium is taken into account, the 
relevant question that is posed is how it happened that a given system reached such configuration, 
whose existence is only one of the many possible interesting epiphanies of economic behaviour.   20
Economists working within one paradigm or the other pose different questions. Whether 
equilibrium exists and persists or not, and whether agents have maximised their objective function 
in that state of the system or not, are questions that would not bother much a complexity theorist 
who investigates instead which micro rules are able to generate equilibrium or any other macro 
pattern. Questions posed under the two paradigms also have different structures. Mainstream 
economics proceeds by deductive formal proofs of theorems whose power is positively related to 
the range of the applicability of solutions. Complex system are increasingly explored by using 
computer simulations that are able to master heterogeneity of agents, physical space, historical time, 
learning and autonomous decentralised interaction. Computer simulations are a sort of mental 
experiment conducted in silico: scientists wonder which micro rules can generate a macro 
configuration, write them down in an algorithm and let the computer unfold their implications. 
Computers greatly extend the computational skills of researchers and make the need for simplifying 
assumptions less stringent. Results of the research, in complexity, are interpreted as candidate 
explanations whose goodness needs to be tested through sensitivity analysis and validation. Good 
solutions are regarded as particular explanations whose scope is limited in space and time. Whereas 
mainstream economists consider an explanation good if it is valid (correctly deducted from its 
logical premises) and general. Considering complexity economics as an exception, a violation of the 
mainstream view would be bold: complexity economics is in all respects a paradigm competing 
with the dissolving mainstream theory and with the other heterodox approaches. In some of the 
complexity approach scholars the sense that this competition has already been who by complexity is 
particularly vivid. For instance, Barkley Rosser (2003, p. IX), in describing the growingly 
widespread disaffection from theorems, uses the verbs in their past form as if economics were 
already subsumed under the complexity paradigm. Whereas scholars outside of the complexity 
school see this transformation as a still ongoing process. The paper in which Frank Hahn, in the 
form of a regretful prophecy, depicts the future of economics as the domain of particular solutions 
sought by means of computer simulations is significantly entitled The Next Hundred Years (2001) -.  
V. COMPLEXITY THEORY: WHAT DOES IT TELL ABOUT ECONOMICS THAT WE DID 
NOT ALREADY KNOW? 
 My argument has been developed by showing the fundamental differences between mainstream 
economics and the complexity approach and by stressing that the science of complexity is an 
internally coherent paradigm that offers modelling tools consistent with the assumed 
microfoundation. A further question consists in appreciating whether this different route to 
explanation and understanding has led to genuinely new findings. The bringing of complexity 
theory to economics is controversial. Criticisms range from questioning its applicability to social   21
phenomena tout court to the charge of having developed metaphors that are powerful (the butterfly 
effect, fractals, self-organised criticality, the edge of chaos, and so on) but that do not explain 
anything new (Horgan 1997). Some weaknesses are acknowledged even by theorists within the 
complexity approach: ‘Studies which use a complexity approach often end up justifying themselves 
by how they correspond with already observed facts, rather than with the new insights they provide’ 
(Rosser 1999, p. 184).  
The contribution of this field of enquiry to economics, however, does not appear to behave like 
typical academic fads, characterized by a fast increase in the number of published papers followed 
by a collapse within few years. It is difficult to set a starting point or a clear divide between 
complexity theory and earlier fields such as cybernetics, catastrophe theory and chaos theory, but 
one can safely argue that economic analyses based on a complex systems approach began to appear 
in leading economic journals in the 1980s and were increasingly present through the 1990s and 
2000s: too long a time span to dismiss them as a mere intellectual bubble.  
A detailed survey of the contributions of complexity to economics falls beyond the scope of this 
work
20. Here I only highlight those areas in which they are more numerous or in which discussion 
has been more lively and significant.  
Probably the most uncontroversial result is Brian Arthur’s analysis of increasing returns, in which 
the economy is seen – in opposition with the static neoclassical Walrasian conception – as 
stochastic dynamic process governed by positive feedbacks. His analysis has given a major impulse 
to the issue of equilibrium selection by showing how an arbitrary small historical event could be 
amplified so as to drive the economy towards a given equilibrium
21. The relevance of his treatment 
of increasing returns goes beyond the importance of the analytical achievement per se. Until then, 
increasing returns had been treated as anomalies, dangerous for the local stability of the equilibrium 
and for the presence of competition between firms. On the contrary, looking at the dynamics of 
increasing returns reveals that, while positive feed-backs disrupt the traditional competition leading 
to the equality of marginal values, there are other forces – such as the life-cycle of the firm and 
                                                 
20 For a comprehensive  survey see Markose (2005) 
 
21  While these ideas were initially appreciated by economic historians, they found opposition 
within economics. The attitude changed when Arthur went to Santa Fe Institute in 1987: ‘At a 
conference there the physicists turned around and explained to the economists, including Kenneth 
Arrow, that my approach was absolutely standard in physics […] after that I could see the 
economists in the room relax. I started to have a lot of support from first rate economists’ (in 
Delorme and Hodgson 2005, p. 18). Arthur’s idea was initially applied to the adoption of 
technology and then was applied to economic geography, the evolution of patterns of poverty and 
segregation, and institutional analysis (Arthur 1999, p.108) It has also affected important 
jurisprudential decisions such as the one involving Microsoft’s antitrust issues.  
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innovation – preventing firms from growing endlessly. Therefore, Arthur’s analysis provides an 
important example of how complexity economics can deal with problems that were intractable in 
the previous framework. 
Another influential contribution concerns the emphasis on the relevance of micro interaction to the 
configuration of the macrostructures. Thomas Schelling
22 has shown that, under local interaction, 
agents with a slight preference for having neighbours of the same type generate a segregated world. 
The hiatus between micro behaviour and macro consequences emphasises the need for testing the 
robustness of economic theories to the (often tacit) assumptions concerning interactions: if these are 
non-linear, the behaviour of the economy can be very sophisticated even in the presence of very 
simple individual behaviours. Moreover, Föllmer (1974) showed that under stochastic interaction – 
even in the case of a large number of agents – the use of an average agent is not accurate since the 
effects of random interactions do not offset each other. 
In the wake of Simon’s and Hayek’s works, many studies aimed at questioning the conviction that 
the invisible hand should have ‘rational fingers’ (Epstein 1999). There have been interesting works 
that decouple rationality from equilibrium.  For instance, Axtell and Epstein (1999) showed that 
equilibrium (although not necessarily the one that an agent endowed with perfect rationality would 
have chosen) could be reached by non-rational agents. In a previous work (Epstein and Axtell, 
1996), they also demonstrate that Olympically rational agents were unable to reach any equilibrium. 
This stream of studies shows that assuming Olympic rationality is not only unrealistic but also 
unnecessary and not sufficient to obtain meaningful models. 
A further relevant implication, grounded on the above sketched arguments, results in a criticism to 
the rational expectation hypothesis. In particular, the assumption that all agents use the same (true) 
model to assess the consequences of their actions and that such a model is common knowledge. 
Complexity theory explores the hypothesis that the model governing the environment in which the 
decision making takes place and the decision maker expectations are not given, rather they have to 
be built (rectius: induced) by her (Arthur 1994a, Holland et al. 1997)
23.  The emphasis is on the 
learning process that generates hypotheses concerning the functioning of the system that are 
confirmed or rejected according to their performance. An interesting foray into this domain in 
which there is not a ‘true’ model of the system nor a priori correct expectations is the above 
                                                 
22 While Schelling works on segregation are acknowledged as pioneering generative science (see 
Epstein and Axtell 1996) and he is often included in the economists who ‘dissent’ from mainstream 
economics, in an interview (2005, p.38) he declared ‘I consider myself in the rational-choice school, 
absolutely. But I am more interested in exceptions than many other economists tend to be’. 
 
23 In this sense, complexity stems from the ‘multitude of elements in the form of beliefs models that 
adapt to the aggregate environment they jointly create’ (Arthur 1994b, p. 410).  
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mentioned ‘El Farol Bar Problem’ (Arthur 1994b). Arthur’s work maintains that in many contexts 
(e.g. stock market, oligopoly pricing) the most appropriate model of rationality is the inductive one, 
consistently with procedural rationality.  
 
VI.  NEW PARADIGM, OLD ROOTS 
The science of complexity proper has its roots in cybernetics, but as far as economics is concerned, 
the attempt at capturing the way in which regularities emerge from decentralised interaction of 
autonomous and heterogeneous agents has a longer tradition the permeates the entire history of the 
discipline, since Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand metaphor. Some scholars, however, have been closer 
to the complexity view in its current meaning.   
The most lucid reflections on the complex nature of economics are to be found in Marshall, Keynes 
and Hayek as discussed at length in Marchionatti (2002) and (Vriend 1999), on which I rely. 
These scholars singled out many of the aspects and implications of the complexity of contemporary 
science. For instance, Marshall thought that biology – and not mathematical physics – was the 
science closest in spirit to economics and that there was no such thing as a general economic law 
which could  be as precise as the laws of physics (Marshall 1961, p. 14)
24.  Moreover, in his view 
exactness could not be attained because of the ‘variety and uncertainty of human action’ (ibid., p. 
781).  Deductive reasoning applies only in very simplified contexts because as we proceed in the 
speculation, the number of circumstances and their reciprocal influences increase as to impair any 
useful conclusion. Consequently, Marshall disapproved the extensive use of mathematics – in its 
typical deductive form. 
Keynes was concerned with the nature of economic material which is ‘[…] in too many respects, 
not homogeneous through time” (Keynes 1973: 297). In fact, economics has to cope with “motives, 
expectations, psychological uncertainties”
  that change in time and make the analysis less precise
25.  
That is, in a context of limited knowledge and structural uncertainty the object of analysis becomes 
complex. Non-homogeneity through time requires inductive analysis and attention to the particular 
characteristics of the historical world. In the light of this consideration, it is clear that for Keynes 
generalisation is not possible. 
                                                 
24 Marshall is quoted in the most disparate situations. Milton Friedman (1953, p. 7) quoting ‘The 
Present Position of Economics’ (1885) to candidate formal logic and factual observation as 
‘systematic and organized methods of reasoning’ is paradigmatic. 
 
25 The similitude with Arthur thought in this case is striking: ‘economy relies on human being and 
not on orderly machine components. Human beings with all their caprices, emotions, and foibles’ 
(1994a, p.1).  
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Hayek, in writing about sensory and spontaneous orders, describes their nature of self-organising 
structures characterised by self co-ordination and self-control. Order is inter-connective: ‘its actions 
are determined by the relation and mutual adjustment to each other of the elements of which it 
consists’ (Hayek 1967b, p. 73) and the many connections, ‘proceeding at any moment, can mutually 
influence each other’ (Hayek 1952, p. 112). For what concerns social spontaneous orders, they are 
based exclusively on the attempts of individuals to reach self-set goals (Hayek 1978, chap XII).   
While it would be bold to argue of a continuous line linking these authors to the present endeavour, 
I will however put forward a conjecture. In the absence of methods able to encompass 
heterogeneity, uncertainty and connectivity, the speculations of these scholars on the complex 
nature of economics and economic phenomena have been interpreted as abstract considerations: 
Marshall’s evolutionary metaphor of the trees in the forest, Keynes’s animal spirits, and Hayek’s 
spontaneous order were often regarded as non susceptible of formalisation. The mathematisation 
and axiomatisation of economics – which gave scholars a language which was not only descriptive 
but also analytic – seemed a more viable route to economic analysis. The computational methods 
developed by the science of complexity bridge this gap between ideas and analyses, offering a 
convenient way to actually apply the ‘abstract’ insights reviewed above (Vriend 1999).  Progresses 
in mathematical techniques and advances in computational power have made old propositions and 
intuitions tractable. The application of the categories of the complexity paradigm is likely to reveal 
hidden insights in the theories of those economists who in the past have caught the complexity of 
their discipline (see for instance, Fontana and Marchionatti 2007). 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Complexity is still a young and evolving branch of science. In economics its boundaries are 
growing more and more precise, the number of researchers defining themselves as ‘complexity 
scholars’ is rising and specialised journals devoted to their works have been founded. At the same 
time, their presence on established journals is increasing. Here I have tried to draw the implications 
of these facts. A comparison between the mainstream and the complexity view has shown that the 
latter is incompatible with the former. That is, adhering to the complexity perspective implies a 
rejection of the received conceptual categories and tools. I have focused on the role of mathematics 
stressing the importance it has had in economic science so far. Its relevance is necessarily is 
reduced in complexity since endogenous changes and heterogeneity make complex systems 
intractable by means of system of equations, while self-reference impairs deductive reasoning.  
Having appreciated that complexity theory cannot be included in the mainstream approach to 
economics, the paper has dealt with its internal consistency: I have shown that complexity theory 
can be considered a paradigm, according to Kuhn’s categories, and its tenets have been described. A   25
further level of the analysis has regarded the results of the line of research developed within the 
complexity view. These works explore new ambits of economic phenomena: increasing returns 
cease to be considered anomalies, the effects of interaction and the emergence of macro pattern are 
encompassed, inductive reasoning is applied to solve paradoxes generated by self-reference. A final 
reflection has been devoted to those scholars that, in the history of economics, have caught the 
complex nature of their discipline. The short foray in the past of economic theory is not only an 
exercise in the history of economic thought, it also suggests that the effects of many interesting 
theoretical propositions have not been investigated due to the lack of available methods apt to cope 
with complexity.  
In spite of some ambiguities in contemporary scholars’ statements, we can state - echoing Brian 
Arthur - that ‘the economics of complexity is not an adjunct to standard economic theory but theory 
at a more general, out-of equilibrium, level’ (Arthur 1999, p. 108).  
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